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The emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 respiratory virus has required an unprecedented 29 
response to control the spread of the infection and protect the most vulnerable within 30 
society. Whilst the pandemic has focused society on the threat of emerging infections and 31 
hand hygiene, certain infection control and antimicrobial stewardship policies may have 32 
to be relaxed. It is unclear whether the unintended consequences of these changes will 33 
have a net-positive or -negative impact on rates of antimicrobial resistance. Whilst the 34 
urgent focus must be on allaying this pandemic, sustained efforts to address the longer-35 










Summary: 98 words 46 
Text: 1178 words47 
Main text 48 
The emergence of, and subsequent pandemic caused by the Severe Acute Respiratory 49 
Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has placed an immense strain on healthcare 50 
systems.1,2 This has required unprecedented response(s) to control the spread of 51 
infection and protect the most vulnerable.  52 
In response to the pandemic, healthcare systems have rapidly adapted infection control 53 
policies to ensure adequate capacity to isolate patients with potential SARS-CoV-2 54 
infection. Societal focus on the threat from this emerging infectious disease has driven a 55 
heightened awareness of the importance of personal hygiene, particularly hand hygiene, 56 
environmental contamination, and increased use of personal protective equipment (PPE). 57 
The pandemic is also likely to require the relaxing of measures to prevent the spread of 58 
multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO), such as screening and isolation in single rooms, 59 
and antimicrobial stewardship.  60 
The paucity of available data makes it difficult to predict the impact that this pandemic 61 
may have on antimicrobial stewardship programs and long-term rates of antimicrobial 62 
resistance (AMR). On one hand, the increased focus on hand hygiene, attempts to limit 63 
patient contact, and social distancing may lead to reductions in healthcare associated 64 
transmission of disease. On the other hand, due to the prioritization of isolation rooms to 65 
COVID patients, the cohorting and/or management in open bays of patients colonized 66 
with CPE/VRE/MRSA/Clostridium difficile (C.difficile), and the inevitable higher workload 67 
of healthcare workers may potentially lead to a higher number of hospital transmissions. 68 
The potential propagation of AMR may also be exacerbated by increasing rates of 69 
antimicrobial prescribing and potential breakdown in well-established stewardship 70 
programs. For example, despite few reports of bacterial co-infection, 62% of patients with 71 
COVID-19 had received antimicrobial therapy in the recent International Severe Acute 72 
Respiratory and Emerging Infections Consortium (ISARIC) report.3 These prescriptions 73 
tend to be broad-spectrum in nature.4 In addition to excessive and inappropriate 74 
antimicrobial prescribing, the spread of other pathogens and MDRO’s may also be 75 
affected by day-to-day practicalities of an emergency focus on a single primary pathogen 76 
which may affect the depth of sampling for other organisms. The redeployment of 77 
antimicrobial stewardship teams and laboratory capacity to support the workload 78 
associated with SARS-CoV-2 is likely to compound this further.  79 
With predictions that the current pandemic could continue to consume the focus of 80 
individual national healthcare systems such as the United Kingdom and United States for 81 
up to 18 months,5 urgent analysis of its impact on AMR is required. This will support the 82 
development of contingency interventions to mitigate the potential impact of the pandemic 83 
on rates and transmission of AMR. Learning early lessons from countries currently 84 
affected will be important in supporting evidence-based guidance for those regions not 85 
yet burdened by an exponential rise in COVID-19 cases. In particular, the unintended 86 
consequences, whether positive or negative, of these health system changes need to be 87 
described, and where negative impacts are identified these must be mitigated against to 88 
ensure that sustained efforts to address the long-term and devastating threat of AMR. 89 
Table 1 outlines some of the core antimicrobial stewardship efforts affected by the SARS-90 
CoV-2 pandemic, suggesting potential interventions to help mitigate the impact of the 91 
pandemic response on AMR.  92 
With the rapid redeployment of side rooms and PPE to protect patients and staff from 93 
respiratory viral infections and saturation of any isolation capacity, the ability to adhere to 94 
isolation policies normally deployed to prevent the spread of MDROs is likely to be 95 
challenged.(REF) Whilst increased hand hygiene may help prevent transmission6 - 96 
pragmatic interventions are required to ensure sustained surveillance for MDRO’s in both 97 
SARS-CoV-2 positive and negative patient cohorts.   98 
With the disruption to routine services and redeployment of staff to alternative areas, such 99 
as critical care, is likely to cause disruption to engrained, top down antimicrobial 100 
stewardship programs within hospitals. With the requirement for increased infectious 101 
disease support for managing the response to the pandemic, stewardship teams may be 102 
redeployed from their primary roles leading to reduced opportunities to optimize 103 
antimicrobial therapy in patients. Loss of expert support for antimicrobial decision making, 104 
a paucity of evidence-based guidelines for antimicrobial prescribing in SARS-CoV-2, and 105 
anxiety of medical colleagues in front of deteriorating patients, may lead to further 106 
inappropriate use of antimicrobials. Urgent steps are needed to develop consensus on 107 
empirical use of antimicrobials together with clarification on the role of Watch and Reserve 108 
agents in the WHO essential medicines AWaRe criteria.7 To support the redeployment of 109 
stewardship teams, leadership must be developed within local teams managing SARS-110 
CoV-2 patients, supported by the development of evidence-based guidelines for the role 111 
of diagnostic tests, such a procalcitonin, to inform appropriate empirical treatment.(REF)  112 
Institutions must also focus on behavioral factors and team dynamics that will come under 113 
immense pressure as healthcare services respond to the increase in demand associated 114 
with the pandemic. Team dynamics, fear, and specialty level cultural norms of practice 115 
are major drivers of inappropriate antimicrobial prescribing.8 These factors must rapidly 116 
be assessed and stabilised in the face of a large variations in staffing levels within 117 
healthcare systems in the coming months. This will require effective leadership, clear 118 
communication across professions, and realigning chains of command in order to 119 
accommodate staff from multiple professions and experience. We must learn from 120 
existing social science research to be responsive and adaptive to the changing priorities 121 
and clinical needs. This cannot be achieved without engagement from across the 122 
healthcare multi-professional teams; the very personnel the interventions will target.  123 
The planned implementation of large field-hospitals with a major focus on a primary viral 124 
pathogen also presents potential negative drivers for control of AMR. Uncertainty 125 
regarding the levels of staffing and support services for such facilities, as well the 126 
pressures of clinical practice and patient culture in such a setting do present opportunities 127 
for many of relevant MDRO’s to spread with or without disease presentation.    128 
In community practice, primary and secondary care has rapidly shifted towards 129 
telemedicine.9 This is a vital step in protecting both healthcare workers and patients, but 130 
currently has limited data to support its potential to reduce or propagate suboptimal 131 
antimicrobial prescribing, and therefore AMR.10,11 Limited evidence suggests that 132 
telemedicine is associated with increased rates of antimicrobial use.10,11 Currently, there 133 
is little guidance and support for colleagues practicing telemedicine for the management 134 
of infection. With primary care being the biggest prescriber of antimicrobials, there is an 135 
urgent need for education and training, development of risk stratification, and guidance 136 
that is specific for telemedicine consultations. Community pharmacy roles must be 137 
urgently developed to support appropriate stewardship of antimicrobials prescribed by 138 
this route.  139 
In summary, before the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in December 2019, major national and 140 
international interventions had begun to focus on reducing the potential future impact of 141 
AMR on society. The consequences of the current pandemic have the potential to stretch 142 
well into the post-COVID19 era. With increased societal sensitization towards emerging 143 
threats from infectious diseases and the concept of transmission and acquisition of 144 
disease, this may subsequently drive greater engagement with the problem of AMR. 145 
However, the current pandemic may also have a greater impact on society through the 146 
unintended propagation of AMR. Whilst, undoubtedly the main focus of healthcare must 147 
be on controlling the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and mitigating immediate impact on 148 
individual patients, we must not lose sight of the longer-term threat of AMR if our current 149 
structures and stewardship programs are completely disrupted during this unprecedented 150 
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Table 1. Potential impacts of healthcare system adaption during the COVID-19 pandemic on 
antimicrobial resistance. 
Effected area Potential impact Potential interventions 
Increased focus on hand hygiene 
in hospitals 
Reduction in the spread of AMR 
within healthcare settings. 
Ensure adequate resources and 
equipment available to support 
increase in demand (e.g. hand 
sanitizer). 
 
Ensure that routine surveillance 
systems remain in place to monitor 
rates of AMR within healthcare 
settings. 
 
Social distancing in the 
community 
Reduction in antimicrobial seeking 
behaviours by members of the 
public, leading to reductions in 
antimicrobial prescribing.  




Less opportunity for isolation of 
infective / MDRO patients 
Potential spread of MDRO. 
 
Potential for suboptimal 
management of other public health 
challenges (e.g. tuberculosis). 
Hand hygiene and barrier nursing. 
 
Sustaining MDRO surveillance. 
 
Staff and patient education & 
training. 
 
Clustered cohorting of patients by 
risk-factor (e.g. COVID-19 & CPE, 
COVID-19 & MRSA). 
 
Pre-emptive discharge of patients 
and cancellation of routine 
procedures to enhance bed 
capacity 
Reduction in patients carrying 




Stringent surveillance systems to 
detect and track the spread of AMR 
on reintroduction of these patients 
to healthcare services. 
 
Diversion of all PPE for SARS-
CoV-2 patients 
Potential spread of MDRO. 
 
Hand hygiene and barrier nursing. 
 
Sustaining MDRO surveillance. 
 
Staff and patient education & 
training. 
 
Appropriate stratification of PPE for 
different indications in line with 
evidence-based guidelines. 
 
Increased rates of empirical 
antimicrobial therapy for patients 
presenting with respiratory 
symptoms 
Potentiation of AMR. Clear guidelines for empirical 
therapy in suspected SARS-CoV-2 
patients. Specifically delineating the 
requirement for anti-pseudomonal 
and / or atypical coverage. 
 
Education and emphasis on local 
stewardship within all healthcare 
workers.  
 
Re-establishment of AMS oversight 
as soon as possible. 
 
Upskilling of staff within the 
organisation (e.g nurses and 
pharmacy technicians) to take on 
broader roles and responsibilities. 
 
Development of rapid diagnostics to 
support prescribing decisions. 
Including a clear role for the use of 
procalcitonin to detect bacterial 
infection. 
 
Ensuring that pandemic 
preparedness is part of future IPC 
and AMS strategy. 
Increased rate of telemedicine 
within primary and secondary 
care and outpatient services 
Possible increase in community 
rates of antimicrobial prescribing as 
part of safety netting. 
 
Possible reduction in community 
antimicrobial prescriptions due to 
social distancing and reduced 
access to pharmacies. 
Need for education and specialist 
support to develop AMS strategies 
for telemedicine.  
 
Engagement with community-based 
pharmacies, who may not be 
confident in screening secondary 
care medicines.  
 
Need for development in technology 
to support risk stratification. 
Redeployment of antimicrobial 
stewardship teams to deal with 
healthcare strain due to 
pandemic 
Loss of developed stewardship 
frameworks within local healthcare 
environments. 
Focus on education and 
responsibility of individual teams for 
promotion of appropriate 
antimicrobial usage. 
 
Addressing current social 
hierarchies within healthcare and  
upskilling of staff within the 
organisation (e.g nurses and 
pharmacy technicians) to provide 
routine AMS services. 
 
Integration of AMS / IPC teams. 
Maintenance of institutional 
memory and team dynamics 
within organisations 
experiencing rapid reorganization 
and recruitment of staff  
Loss of best practice and leadership 
within local team environments. 
Education and training. 
 
Focus on fostering positive 
behaviours towards antimicrobials 
and infection control.  
 
Ensuring that structures are agile 
enough to absorb new individuals 
with minimal impact of process and 
patient care.  
Overcrowding associated with 
overloading of healthcare 
systems 
Major driver for the transmission of 
AMR.  
Stringent surveillance systems to 
detect and track the spread of AMR. 
 
Ensuring that routine MDRO 
screening still takes place in the 
face of increased viral screening. 
 
Cohorting of high-risk patients.  
 
Contingency plans for rapidly 
responding to detected outbreaks. 
Depletion of structural resources Loss of side room capacity leading 
to propagation of SARS-CoV-2 
infection due to cohorting of positive 
and negative patients. 
Stringent pathways for segregation 
of cases.  
 
Rapid diagnostics to facilitate rapid 
identification. 
  
Legend: AMR = antimicrobial resistance; AMS = antimicrobial stewardship; CPE = carbapenemase 
producing enterobacteriaceae; COVID-19 = novel coronavirus 2019; IPC = infection prevention and 
control; MDRO = multi-drug resistant organism; MRSA = meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus; 
PPE = personal protective equipment; SARS-COV-2 = severe acute respiratory distress coronavirus 2 
